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The Hard, Simple Truth about Gun Control 
 
Carl T. Bogus∗ 
 
Gun control can be extremely effective at significantly reducing homicides, suicides, and 
gun-related robberies, assaults, and injuries. There is substantial evidence supporting that 
conclusion. However, the simple, hard truth is that only one form of gun control has been shown 
to be effective – namely, anything that significantly reduces the number of handguns in general 
circulation. The implications of that argument are enormous. In 2008, the United States Supreme 
Court held that individuals have a constitutional right to have handguns in their homes, and 
therefore a system of regulation designed to reduce the number of handguns in American homes 
would be unconstitutional. Gun control advocates faced political obstacles before that ruling. 
Rather than acknowledge the simple, hard truth, they opted instead to advocate so-called 
common sense measures, even though there is little evidence suggesting modest measures are 
likely to be effective. That strategy led to Pyrrhic victories. The strategy was counterproductive 
for public opinion over the long run, and it may well have misled Supreme Court justices into 
believing that their Second Amendment decision had no adverse public health consequences. It 
is, therefore, important to be clear about the choice before us. The choice is not whether America 
will have effective gun control today. It can’t. The choice is whether America will have effective 
gun control in the future. While public opinion, politics, and constitutional law currently bar the 
way, all three are malleable. The public, politicians, and judges can all be educated. That must 
begin, however, with telling the simple, hard truth about gun control. 
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I. 
 There are two kinds of people: those who divide the world into two kinds of people and 
those who don’t. That old joke gets at the heart of the simple truth about gun control. The 
general consensus today is that society is divided into two kinds of people: those who can 
be trusted with guns and those who cannot. The goal is to devise a system of firearm 
regulation that allows responsible people to own guns and denies them to irresponsible 
people. Both gun control advocates and opponents implicitly accept that basic approach, 
even though they passionately disagree about how to implement it. Elected officials, who 
have little time to study the issue and rely on what advocacy groups on their side of the 
ideological divide tell them, also accept the consensus model. The problem with that model, 
however, is that it is stems from fantasy. Society is not divided into two kinds of people; 
things are far more complicated than that. Moreover, even to the extent that there may be 
some kind of division between the trustworthy and the untrustworthy, it is not possible to 
devise a regulatory scheme that can effectively distinguish between the two. Nor will that 
ever be possible. The implacable obstacle to the consensus model is human nature, and that 
is not going to change. 
 That does not mean effective gun control is impossible. It is possible, and in fact, it has 
long existed in other affluent nations. Rhetoric about American exceptionalism 
notwithstanding, human beings in America are not different than human beings elsewhere. 
As we shall see, what makes the United States different from other affluent nations is not its 
level of violence, but its level of lethal violence – and that difference is due to the prevalence 
of guns. Other nations are horrified by the level of lethal violence we tolerate. If we regulated 
guns the way other countries do, we would save more lives and avoid more injuries than 
U.S. Armed Forces experience in wars.  
 Why do Americans accept so much unnecessary carnage? For some Americans, the 
choice is a conscious one. They are willing to pay the price of living in a society with more 
gun-related homicides, injuries, robberies, assaults, and suicides in order to have what they 
perceive to be freedom. The Founders, they believe, bequeathed us a sacred Second 
Amendment right. But for most Americans, the choice is largely unexamined. Because they 
don’t hear people advocating for a different model, they assume that no other model is 
possible. They are not sure whether it is unavailable as a matter of constitutional law, 
politics, or sociology. They haven’t thought it through far enough to ask whether another 
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model is possible. Quite understandably, what they consider is framed by what they hear, 
and what they hear from all sides involves some variation of the good guy/bad guy model. 
 Gun control advocates routinely say that we must adopt “common sense” measures that 
keep guns out of the hands of criminals, the dangerously mentally ill, and potential terrorists 
while allowing responsible citizens to own guns.1 That, pretty much, is what everyone 
believes. The principal difference is that the gun control supporters stress keeping guns out 
of the hands of the irresponsible while gun control opponents stress allowing the responsible 
to own and carry guns. For example, Hillary Clinton’s official presidential campaign 
platform stated that she “has a record of advocating for commonsense approaches to reduce 
gun violence,” and favored keeping “guns out of the hands of domestic abusers, other violent 
criminals, and the severely mentally ill.”2 Meanwhile, in his official presidential campaign 
platform Donald Trump said:  
Here’s another important way to fight crime – empower law-abiding gun owners to 
defend themselves. Law enforcement is great, they do a tremendous job, but they 
can’t be everywhere all of the time. Our personal protection is ultimately up to us. 
That’s why I’m a gun owner, that’s why I have a concealed carry permit, and that’s 
why tens of millions of Americans have concealed carry permits as well. It’s just 
common sense. To make America great again, we’re going to go after criminals 
and put the law back on the side of the law-abiding.3 
 To say that both sides agree on the same basic model is not to say that both sides are in 
basic agreement. They are not. Gun control advocates want more rigorous restrictions on 
gun ownership and gun control opponents want either no more restrictions or want to relax 
existing restrictions. The issue that Trump mentioned – concealed carry permits – is a 
particular case in point: gun-rights organizations want private citizens to be able to carry 
concealed weapons on the public streets while gun control opponents do not want them to. 
This may be a significant detail, but it is a detail nonetheless. Whether or not citizens should 
be able to carry concealed handguns on the streets, both sides implicitly accept the same 
fundamental model that good guys should be able to possess handguns and bad guys should 
not. 
 What other model is possible? While it isn’t possible to meaningfully divide people into 
two clear categories, it is possible to do that with gun control models. The two fundamental 
models are these: (1) everyone may possess a handgun except those who cannot; and (2) no 
one may possess a handgun except those who can. Note, first, that I have focused on 
handguns, not all guns. I shall, in due course, explain why the difference between handguns 
and long guns – that is, rifles and shotguns – is so important. The second thing to note is that 
despite the symmetry in descriptions, these are two fundamentally different models. The first 
model allows anyone to possess a handgun unless he or she demonstrably falls into a 
                                                          
1 A search in the Westlaw news data base for articles that contain the phrase “common sense” within ten words of 
the phrase “gun control,” conducted on January 13, 2017, found more than three thousand such articles. Typically, 
those advocating for “common sense gun control” are gun control advocates, but occasionally gun control opponents 
also use the phrase. For example, in his official campaign platform Donald Trump supported       
2 https://www.hillaryclinton.com/issues/gun-violence-prevention/ 
3 https://assets.donaldjtrump.com/Second_Amendment_Rights.pdf (This document accessed by hyper-jump from 
https://www.donaldjtrump.com/policies/constitution-and-second-amendment.) 
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prohibited category, such as being a convicted felon, mentally ill, on a terrorist watch list, or 
the like. The second model allows no one to possess a handgun unless he or she falls into an 
exempted category, such as being a law enforcement officer, a member of the military, a 
security guard, or having a special need to own a handgun. Who among the general public 
has a special need to own a handgun? Although it may be a bit dated, my favorite example 
is Salman Rushdie, following the fatwa issued by the Ayatollah Khomeini calling for 
Rushdie’s execution.4 A more pedestrian example might be women who reasonably fear 
attack from a stalker.5 Once again, while the details are not unimportant, they are details 
nonetheless. The basic difference between the two models is that the first presumptively 
grants a right to own a handgun to everyone, except those who demonstrably fit into special 
categories. The second model presumptively grants a right to own a handgun to no one, 
except those who demonstrably fit into special categories. The most consequential difference 
between the two models is that there will be far fewer handguns in general circulation under 
the second model than the first. That, as we shall see, makes all the difference in the world, 
for there is one kind of gun control that works – and only one kind that works – and it is this: 
anything that significantly reduces the number of handguns in general circulation. 
 That last sentence may bring some readers up short, for they immediately realize the 
terrible implications of my argument. In 2008, the United States Supreme Court held that 
the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution grants individuals a right to keep 
handguns in their homes.6 Would a gun control program specifically designed to reduce the 
number of handguns in general circulation be unconstitutional? And am I arguing that only 
a program designed to accomplish that objective would be effective? The answers to both 
questions, broadly speaking, are yes. That is the hard, simple truth about gun control. 
 Why, then, read on? Do you really want to learn that the only kind of gun control that 
will be effective cannot be enacted into law? Suffice it say, for now, that I think you should 
read on. To reduce the gun carnage in America, we need to be clear-eyed about the facts. 
And, ultimately, we can in fact reduce the gun carnage. 
 
II. 
 Donald Trump mentioned concealed carry because it is currently a hot political issue, 
so let’s start with the ability to carry handguns in public places. There are two different 
modes of handgun carry – open carry and concealed carry, depending upon whether one is 
carrying a visibly displayed handgun, most commonly in a holster on one’s hip, or whether 
                                                          
4 See Salman Rushdie, The Disappeared: How the fatwa changed a writer’s life, The New Yorker, Sept. 17, 2012, 
available at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/09/17/the-disappeared. 
5 I say “might” because there are different kinds of stalkers, some more dangerous than others, and there would have 
to be a determination that an applicant for gun permit reasonably fears physical attack. It is indisputable, however, 
that stalking threats are serious and widespread. Each year in the U.S. about 3.4 million people are victims of 
stalking. Katrina Baum, et al., “Stalking Victimization in the United States,” Bureau of Justice Statistics, Jan. 2009, 
1, available at https://victimsofcrime.org/docs/src/baum-k-catalano-s-rand-m-rose-k-2009.pdf?sfvrsn=0. Nearly a 
third of stalking victims fear bodily harm, a quarter fear that child or some other family member will be hurt or 
kidnapped, and about nine percent fear being killed. Ibid., 7. All too often, these fears are not groundless: 39,000 
people in the U.S. are raped or sexually assaulted and 52,000 are seriously injured by stalkers. Ibid., 8. About three 
percent of stalking victims get a gun for self-protection. Ibid., 6. 
6 D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628-30 (2008). 
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one is carrying a handgun concealed somewhere on one’s person, often in a pocket or in a 
holster under a jacket. Only five states and the District of Columbia absolutely prohibit the 
open carrying of handguns.7 Of the remaining forty-five states, about one-third require a 
license or permit to openly carry a handgun and two-thirds do not require a license or 
permit.8 
 Open carry has long been legally permitted in most states. It has never been much of an 
issue because so few people do it. Legal restrictions on open carry have been largely 
unnecessary because there is a strong cultural deterrent to openly carrying handguns: people 
are afraid of other people that they see walking around in public places with a handgun 
strapped to their waist. Restaurants, stores, and office buildings will ask gun-toting 
individuals to leave their premises. Those that don’t do so are likely to see patrons quickly 
depart.  Some people call the police when they see someone carrying a gun in a public place, 
and some police forces actively discourage open carry of weapons, even where it is permitted 
by law. A spokesperson for the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania police department declared that 
someone openly carrying a handgun should expect to be “inconvenienced” by, for example, 
being ordered to lay on the ground while police checked his permit, a process that might take 
some time as the first police officer on the scene might not approach the person he has – at 
gunpoint – ordered to the ground until backup has arrived.9 An organization named 
OpenCarry.org is dedicated to trying to make open carry socially acceptable by encouraging 
gun owners to openly carry guns more often.10 Its motto is “A Right Unexercised is a Right 
Lost.” A visit to its website suggests OpenCarry.org is struggling. Its events draw few 
participants, and its website complains that even Utah police find ways to charge people who 
are openly carrying firearms with disorderly conduct.11 However, even if these activists 
persuade police departments not to deliberately inconvenience people who are openly 
carrying handguns in jurisdictions where that is legally allowed, the public is not likely to 
be blasé about gun-toting people mingling with them in supermarkets, movie theaters, 
libraries, and the like, and social pressure will continue to stop open carry from becoming 
more common. 
 Because of the cultural impediments to open carry, the National Rifle Association 
(NRA) and other pro-gun groups have focused on expanding concealed carry.12 In the past, 
                                                          
7 The five states are California, Florida, Illinois, New York, and South Carolina. See “Open Carrying: Summary of 
State Laws,” Lawyers Center to Prevent Gun Violence, http://smartgunlaws.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/firearms-in-
public-places/open-carrying/#state. 
8 A few states have mixed regulations. Pennsylvania, for example, requires a license to openly carry a firearm in the 
City of Philadelphia, but does not require a license to do so elsewhere in the state. In North Dakota, someone 
without a concealed weapons permit may openly carry an unloaded handgun during daylight hours while someone 
with such a permit may openly carry a handgun during the day or night. Ibid. 
9 Stephen Clark, After Altercation, Philadelphia Police Say They Won’t Look the Other Way on Open-Carry Gun 
Owners, Fox News, May 21, 2011, available at http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/05/21/altercation-
philadelphia-police-say-wont-look-way-open-carry-gun-owners.html. An open-carry gun activist who was 
inconvenienced in this manner sued Philadelphia and won a $25,000 judgment.  
http://www.newsworks.org/index.php/local/philadelphia/35164-25000-judgment-in-suit-against-philly-over-
permitted-gun. 
10 http://www.opencarry.org/ 
11 http://www.opencarry.org/is-open-carry-disorderly-conduct/ 
12 https://www.nraila.org/articles/20170113/national-concealed-carry-reciprocity-lies-an8.d-the-lying-liars-who-tell-
them 
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most states either prohibited concealed carry entirely or had restrictive permitting systems.13 
Many states had “may issue” permit laws that gave the chief of police or other law 
enforcement official the discretion to issue a concealed carry permit to individuals who had 
special reasons to be armed. Chiefs of police typically granted few permits. The NRA, 
therefore, started lobbying states to enact “shall issue” permit laws that require the chief of 
police to issue a concealed carry permit to all applicants who do not fit into specified 
categories, such as having a record of criminal convictions or mental illness. The NRA 
lobbying effort got a big assist in 1997 when two economists, John R. Lott and David B. 
Mustard, published a paper in which, using complex econometric models, they claimed to 
have found an inverse statistical correlation between shall issue concealed carry laws and 
violent crimes.14 The following year Lott expanded his thesis into a book titled More Guns, 
Less Crime.15  Lott wrote: 
Allowing citizens to carry concealed handguns reduces violent crimes, and the 
reductions coincide very closely with the number of concealed-handgun permits 
issued. Mass shootings in public places are reduced when law-abiding citizens are 
allowed to carry concealed handguns.16 
 Notice the term “law-abiding citizens.” It is the good guy/bad guy model that implicitly 
explains Lott’s findings. The idea is that we can indeed sort out the good guys. Most 
obviously, police run a criminal records check on people applying for concealed carry 
permits, and criminals have criminal records. But, of course, that last statement cannot be 
completely true, if only because some criminals have not yet been caught. But, I suggest, 
there is another assumption lurking here, albeit unexamined: only good guys apply for 
concealed carry permits. That is not how bad guys behave (even bad guys without rap 
sheets). 
 Lott argued that concealed carry effectively deters violent crime because criminals are 
hesitant to rob or attack people who may be armed. When criminals realize that some 
significant fraction of potential victims are armed, but they cannot tell who is armed and 
who is not, they make a rational decision to change their behavior. The Lott-Mustard model 
showed that concealed carry laws were associated with a rise in property crime; Lott 
suggested this was because criminals, finding it more risky to rob people who may turn out 
to armed, turned to safer alternatives such as auto theft and other non-violent property 
crimes.17   
 The Lott-Mustard paper, and Lott’s book, created a sensation.18 They supercharged 
NRA lobbying efforts for concealed carry laws. By 2014, forty-one states had shall issue 
concealed carry laws or allowed citizens to carry concealed weapons without a permit or 
                                                          
13 Dennis A. Henigan, “Guns Don’t Kill People, People Kill People” And Other Myths About Gun Control (Boston: 
Beacon Press 2016), 122. 
14 John R. Lott and David B. Mustard, “Crime, Deterrence, and the Right-to-Carry Concealed Handguns, Journal of 
Legal Studies 26:1 (1997).  
15 John R. Lott, More Guns, Less Crime (Chicago: U. Chicago Press 1998). 
16 Ibid., 19. 
17 Ibid., 19 and 54. 
18 For example, on August 2, 1996, USA Today ran a prominent story about the paper titled “Fewer Rapes, Killings 
Found Where Concealed Guns Legal.” Dennis A. Henigan, supra, at 130. 
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license.19 In 1999, 2.7 million Americans had concealed carry permits. By mid-2014, that 
had increased to 11.1 million people.20 
 There are two big problems with Lott’s “more guns, less crime” thesis. First, other 
researchers discredited his econometric analysis. Lott compared change in crime during the 
period 1985 to 1991 between states that adopted shall issue laws and those did not; he 
claimed to find that smaller increases in crime in the first group than in the second group. 
This was a period of time during which crime was rising nationally. Criminologists believed 
that, in at least significant part, the rise was due to a skyrocketing use of crack cocaine, 
especially in poor neighborhoods of large cities.21 However, the two groups of states were 
very different in this regard. For example, states that enacted shall issue laws included 
Maine, Idaho, and Montana while those that did not enact such laws included New York, 
California, and New Jersey. John J. Donohue and Ian Ayres, researchers at Stanford 
University and Yale University, respectively, extended the Lott-Mustard analysis through 
1997. Donohue explained their dramatic findings as follows: “When the Lott and Mustard 
statistical model is run for the period in the 1990s when the spikes in crime reversed 
themselves, suddenly shall-issue laws are associated with uniform increases in crime.”22 
 Later, Donohue and Ayres extended their analysis still further to 2006, a period of 
continuing decline in crime generally, and got similar findings.23 Donohue and Ayres also 
found coding errors in the Mustard-Lott model that, when corrected, eliminated the claimed 
effect of concealed carry laws on robbery.24 Meanwhile, Dan A. Black, an economist at the 
University of Chicago, and Daniel S. Nagin, an economist at Carnegie Mellon University, 
found that if the single state of Florida, where crime statistics were usually volatile, was 
removed from the Lott-Mustard econometric model, all of the claimed effects of concealed 
carry laws on violent crime disappeared.25 A host of other researchers, including the most 
prominent pro-gun criminologist, found serious problems with Lott and Mustard’s work. 
The consensus was that conclusions could not reliably be drawn from the Lott-Mustard 
econometric analysis.26  
 The second problem with the “more guns, less crime” thesis is easier to grasp for those 
of us untrained in econometric analysis, namely, the actual results of the expansion in 
                                                          
19 Robert J. Spitzer, The Politics of Gun Control (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 6th ed. 2015), 68. 
20 Justine E. Johnson-Makuch, Comment, “Statutory Restrictions on Concealed Carry: A Five-Circuit Shoot-Out, 83 
Fordham Law Review 83:2757, 2758 (2015).  
21 John J. Donohue, “The Impact of Concealed-Carry Law,” in Evaluating Gun Policy: Effects on Crime and 
Violence (Jens Ludwig & Philip Cook, eds., New York: Oxford U. Press 2003), 289. The price of powdered cocaine 
was falling sharply during the late 1980s, and by 1991 crack cocaine was found in of more than 60 percent of people 
arrested in Manhattan. Franklin E. Zimring, The City That Became Safe: New York’s Lessons for Urban Crime and 
its Control (New York: Oxford University Press 2012), 96-99.   
22 Ibid. (original emphasis).  See also Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue, “Shooting Down the ‘More Guns, Less Crime’ 
Hypothesis,” Stanford Law Review 55:1193 (2003).  
23 Ian Ayres and John J. Donohue, “More Guns, Less Crime Fails Again: The Latest Evidence from 1977-2006,” 
Econ Journal Watch 6:218 (2009). 
24 Donohue, “The Impact of Concealed-Carry Law,” supra note 17, at 293. 
25 Dan A. Black and Daniel A. Nagin, “Do Right-to-Carry Laws Deter Crime?” Journal of Legal Studies 27:209 
(1998).  
26 See generally David Hemenway, Private Guns, Public Health (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 2004), 
101-04.; Henigan, 130-31; Robert J. Spitzer, The Politics of Gun Control (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 6th ed. 
2015), 70-74. The pro-gun criminologist is Gary Kleck of Florida State University. 
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concealed carry. For example, in September of 2013, one car tailgating another in Michigan 
led to a road rage incident in which both drivers drove to a parking lot, got out of their cars, 
pulled out handguns, and shot each other dead.27 Both men had valid concealed carry 
permits. Aside from the reciprocal-murder aspect, this incident was not unusual. The 
Violence Policy Center (VPC) has been trying to track the number of people who were killed 
by someone with a concealed carry permit since May of 2007. This is a difficult undertaking 
because there is no official database of such killings. In fact, some states make it unlawful 
for law enforcement to reveal such information. VPC must, therefore, rely principally on 
news accounts, and its count includes only a fraction of the actual total. As of this writing, 
VPC identified 921 people who were killed by concealed carry permit holders.28 That 
number includes homicides, suicides, and accidents but excludes the very small number of 
shootings made in self-defense. These killings occurred in forty states and the District of 
Columbia. Seventeen victims were law enforcement officers. The incidents include thirty-
one mass shootings that took the lives of 147 victims. It is also worth noting that except for 
suicides, where the lethality rate is very high with guns, there are many more shootings than 
killings because some victims who are wounded survive. 
 One might think that the NRA would be satisfied with its enormous success in 
persuading forty-three states to pass shall issue laws or otherwise liberally allow the carrying 
of concealed handguns.29 Not so. It is currently lobbying for passage of federal legislation 
known as the Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act of 2017.30 This was one of the first bills 
introduced in the 115th Congress, and presently has 132 cosponsors. It would require every 
state to honor a concealed carry permit issued by another state, even if that state does not 
allow concealed carry by its own citizens.  
  
III. 
 Let us next turn to mass shootings. Although mass shootings are not responsible for 
the largest share of gun carnage in America – casualties from more prosaic shootings 
involving one or a few victims far exceed those from mass shootings – mass shootings 
receive a great deal of news coverage and are especially terrorizing. 
 We can begin on August 1, 1966, the day that an engineering student and former U.S. 
Marine named Charles Whitman killed his wife and mother, and then, armed with rifles 
and other guns, climbed to the top of The Tower at the center of campus of the University 
of Texas at Austin, and from that perch shot students and others traversing the campus. 
Before he was killed by Austin police, Whitman murdered a total of eighteen people and 
wounded thirty-two more.31 I have vivid memories of that event. I was then eighteen-
                                                          
27 Johnson-Makuch, 2758. 
28 This was the count as of January 13, 2017. Violence Policy Center, “Concealed Carry Killers,” available at 
http://concealedcarrykillers.org. 
29 According to the NRA, only seven states – California, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland Massachusetts, Rhode Island, 
New Jersey, New York – deny concealed carry to most citizens. See https://www.nraila.org/gun-laws.aspx.  
30 H.R. 38, 115th Congress (2017-18). See https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-
bill/38?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22Concealed+Carry+Reciprocity+Act+of+2017%22%5D%7D&r=1 
31 I include Whitman’s wife and mother, whom he killed earlier that morning, and three individuals he killed in The 
Tower. It does not include Whitman himself. 
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years-old and going off to college in a month. You might think the Whitman massacre 
would have made someone like me and my family anxious, but I don’t remember it 
creating anxiety. This was then the worst shooting massacre in the U.S. history.32 Mass 
shootings before this time were, in fact, rare in America.33 The entire nation was stunned 
and horrified, of course, but we assumed that it was a bizarre event, an anomaly. No one 
realized that Charles Whitman was the harbinger of a new normal. 
 Here is an abbreviated list of some of the more memorable mass shootings: 
 McDonald’s, San Ysidro, CA    1984  22 dead, 19 wounded 
 Cleveland Elementary School, Stockton CA   1989   6 dead, 30 wounded 
 Luby’s Cafeteria, Killen TX    1991 24 dead, 20 wounded 
 Columbine High School, Littleton CO  1999 15 dead, 23 wounded 
   Virginia Tech, Blacksburg VA   2007 33 dead, 17 wounded 
 Safeway Parking Lot, Tucson, AZ   2011   6 dead, 13 wounded 
 Sandy Hook Elementary School, Newton CT 2012 28 dead 
 Inland Regional Center, San Bernadino CA  2015 14 dead, 14 wounded  
 Emanuel A.M.E. Church, Charleston SC  2015   9 dead 
 Pulse Nightclub, Orlando FL    2016 50 dead, 53 wounded 
 Las Vegas, NV     2017 59 dead, 441 wounded 
 Sutherland Springs, TX    2017 26 dead, 20 wounded34 
  
 There is plenty of national anxiety now. My wife and I work in different settings – she 
in a government agency and I in a university – but we have both been required to undergo 
active shooter training by our employers, and surely this has become routine nearly 
everywhere. Americans feel very much at risk of finding themselves in a massacre. The 
general feeling, I believe, is not only that no place is safe, but that eventually there will a 
mass shooting just about everywhere. Because some of the worst massacres have occurred 
in elementary schools, even small children are not spared from worry. Reminders of 
vulnerability are ever-present. My university, for example, has just installed on all classroom 
doors fancy new locks with a red button on the inside side of the door that, when depressed, 
locks the door without need of a key. No one has explained why the new locks have been 
installed – no one needs to – and those red buttons will remind us constantly of potential 
threat. In case you are wondering, to the best of my knowledge no shooting has occurred at 
my university, though there was concern when a former student sent obliquely menacing 
emails to a dean and several faculty members (including me), and then refused to open his 
apartment door to talk to police who came to have a chat with him, making it clear he was 
                                                          
32 See History News Network, The Deadliest Mass Killings in American History by a Single Shooter, June 17, 2016, 
http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/153325. 
33 The impression that mass shootings were rare before 1966 is confirmed by criminologist Grant Duwe, who has 
studied more than 1,300 mass shootings occurring from 1900 to 2013. See N.R. Kleinfield, et al., “Killers Fit a 
Profile, but So Do Many Others,” New York Times, Oct. 14, 2015, 1. 
34 Data for all entries except the last two were taken from Violence Policy Center, “High-Capacity Ammunition 
Magazines are Common Thread Running Through Most Mass Shootings in the United States,” 
http://www.vpc.org/fact_sht/VPCshootinglist.pdf. Data for the last two entries (Las Vegas and Sutherland Springs) 
were taken from http://www.gunviolencearchive.org/mass-shooting?page=1.    
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armed. No weapon was ever fired, but there was a standoff that lasted awhile, an arrest, and 
after some weeks, a release. It feels part of a new normal. 
  There is no universally accepted definition of “mass shooting.”35  How many victims 
does it take to qualify as a mass shooting? Should we count the total number of casualties, 
both killed and wounded, or just fatalities? Should shooters who die at the scene be included 
in the number of fatalities? Researchers and news organizations use different definitions, 
which often makes apple-to-apple comparisons difficult. Gun Violence Archive (GVA), an 
organization that defines its mission as providing independent, verified data about gun 
violence to researchers and the public-at-large through its website, defines mass shooting as 
a single event resulting in four or more people being shot and/or killed, not including the 
shooter.36 
 Depending upon how one defines the term, mass shootings may now, on average, be 
occurring at a rate of about one-a-day in the United States. The New York Times counted 358 
mass shootings with four or more casualties (including killed and wounded) in 2015.  GVA 
counted 275 mass shootings in 2014 and 333 in 2015. At the time I happen to writing this, 
Sunday morning, January 22, 2017, GVA has already counted twenty mass shootings this 
year. 
 Near the end of 2015, the Washington Post looked at mass shootings in the United States 
over the past fifty years. 37 For this purpose, it defined mass shooting as an event in which 
four or more people were killed. It excluded gang killings and killings stemming from other 
crimes such as robberies but included the perpetrator in the number of fatalities. The Post 
identified 124 such events, in which a total of 814 people were killed, for an average of seven 
fatalities per event. These mass shootings occurred in forty states. With only three 
exceptions, all of the shooters were male. The most common venues for the massacres were, 
in declining order, workplaces, retail stores and restaurants, and schools. Shooters brought 
an average of three guns apiece to each shooting, for a total of 243 guns in all incidents. 
Most of the weapons were handguns. It was possible to determine how the shooters acquired 
180 of the guns used, and of those 141 – 78.3 percent – were acquired legally. We also know 
that most mass shooters kill a former or current intimate partner, often at the beginning of 
their rampage.38 
 Can we create a system that will keep guns out of the hands of potential mass shooters 
while still allowing them to trustworthy individuals? The conventional wisdom is that mass 
shooters suffer from serious mental illnesses, and that we might be able to drastically reduce 
                                                          
35 See generally Christopher Ingraham, “What makes a ‘mass shooting’ in America?” Washington Post, Dec. 3, 
2015, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/12/03/what-makes-a-mass-shooting-in-
america/?utm_term=.3f98ff6118fd.  
36 See http://www.gunviolencearchive.org/. For definitions used by the organization, see the Methodology section of 
its website. 
37 For purposes of its survey, the Washington Post defined mass shooting as an event in which four or more people 
were killed by a lone shooter or, in three instances, by two shooters. Bonnier Berkowitz, et al., “50 years of mass 
shootings in the U.S.,” Washington Post., Dec. 13, 2015, A10. 
38 During one four-year period, 57 percent of mass shooters killed a current or former intimate partner, together with 
others. Philip J. Cook & Kristin A. Goss, The Gun Debate: What Everyone Needs to Know (New York: Oxford 
University Press 2014), 50. 
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these events by making improvements in the mental health system.39 However, according to 
Michael Stone, a forensic psychiatrist at Columbia University, only twenty percent of mass 
shooters are suffering from serious mental illnesses such as schizophrenia, delusions, or 
psychoses.40 The rest of them may have personality or sociopathic disorders, and while they 
may be exhibit rage, an extreme lack of empathy, humiliation, or paranoia, they know what 
they are doing. According to Stone, this second group can neither be reliably identified nor 
helped by the mental health system, no matter how well it is improved. Other researchers 
agree. James Alan Fox, a criminologist at Northeastern University, says that most mass 
killers are depressed, not delusional.41 A group of three psychiatrists, a social worker 
specializing in mental health, and a sociologist-economist specializing in gun violence who 
together studied gun violence and mental health note that epidemiological research shows 
that people with mental illness are responsible for only a small proportion of violence in 
America. They go on to write: 
The very small proportion of people with mental illnesses who are inclined to be 
dangerous often do not seek treatment before they do something harmful; they 
therefore do not acquire a gun-disqualifying record of mental health adjudication 
(or criminal record, either) that would show up in a background check. 
Psychiatrists, using clinical judgment, cannot accurately foresee which patients will 
be violent.42 
   Mass murderers, of course, are not the average guys. Experts tell us mass murderers are 
often socially isolated. They don’t fit in and often come from communities where fitting is 
considered very important. They are often frustrated and externalize blame, says James Alan 
Fox. “Nothing is ever their fault….They see themselves as good guys mistreated by 
others.”43 Those who commit family massacres, says Fox, are typically “vengeful” but not 
mentally ill.44 But risk factors such as anger, frustration, alienation, and even some degree 
of paranoia are not useful in identifying people who should be denied firearms. Those 
characteristics are all too common.  
 While it might be possible to develop an algorithm to assess an individual’s risk to 
become violent, such a tool is unlikely to be useful for regulatory purposes. Many studies 
have, for example, found that alcohol abuse is a major risk factor for all types of gun 
violence.45 We know other factors such as gender, age, impulsivity, and lack of family 
support are stronger predictors of violent behavior than is mental illness. John Monahan, a 
psychologist at the University of Virginia, developed a software program that uses 106 risk 
factors to predict the potential for violence for patients being discharged from psychiatric 
hospital units.46 The model shows promise: only ten percent of those who were deemed low-
                                                          
39  Sixty-three percent of Americans blame mass shootings on failings in the mental health system. See Michael S. 
Rosenwald, “Most mass shooters aren’t mentally ill,” Washington Post, May 19, 2016, A1. 
40 Ibid. 
41 See Kleinfield, et al. (quoting Fox).  
42 Jeffrey W. Swanson, et al., “Preventing Gun Violence Involving People with Serious Mental Illness,” in Reducing 
Gun Violence in America: Informing Policy with Evidence and Analysis (Daniel W. Webster & Jon S. Vernick eds., 
Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press 2013), 33, at 36. 
43 See Kleinfield, et al., supra (quoting Fox). 
44 Ibid. 
45 David Brown, “No easy task to identify a mass killer,” Washington Post, Jan. 4, 2003, at A1. 
46 Ibid. 
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risk committed a violent act over the next six months while 49 percent of those deemed high-
risk did so. Nevertheless, such a model will have little utility for regulatory policy. It might 
be helpful in determining whom to release from a mental-health facility, but it will never 
stop people without criminal or mental-health records from purchasing guns. There is, first, 
the practical problem of getting the data. Monahan acquired his information in extensive 
interviews of patients prior to discharge, but how would the government learn that someone 
in the general population sometimes has five drinks in a row or does not have good 
relationships with family members? Second, there are legal barriers. The Supreme Court has 
held that individuals possess a constitutional right to own handguns for self-defense. The 
courts are likely to continue to allow a regulatory system that denies firearms to felons and 
people who have been adjudicated a danger to themselves or others, but they are not going 
to sanction algorithms of the kind Monahan has developed. 
 The good guy/bad guy model is widely accepted though generally unexamined.47 
Occasionally, however, those who examine the data and think hard about the issue realize 
that it cannot work. There is a strong incentive not to reach this conclusion – not even to 
consider it, in fact – because it leads to pessimism, even despair. But occasionally people 
who examine the data and think hard about the options do realize the futility of the good 
guy/bad guy model. In October 2016, the New York Times published an extensive 
examination of the issue that began on the front page and took up two full interior pages. 
Titled “In 130 of Worst Shootings, Vision of Porous Gun Laws,” the story contained this 
observation: 
[A]n examination of high-casualty shootings emphasizes not only how porous 
existing firearm regulations are, but also how difficult tightening them in a 
meaningful way can be.…The findings are dispiriting to anyone hoping for simple 
legislative fixes to gun violence. In more than half the 130 cases, at least one 
assailant was already barred by federal law from having a weapon, usually because 
of a felony conviction, but nonetheless acquired a gun.…Of the remaining 
assailants, 40 percent had never had a serious run-in with the law and probably 
could have bought a gun even in states with the strictest firearm control.48 
 The hard truth is that the possibility of reducing mass shootings by improving the mental 
health system or the records used for background checks run into four implacable problems. 
First, most perpetrators of gun violence do not suffer from serious mental illness. Second, 
among the perpetrators of gun violence that do suffer from mental illness, few seek 
treatment. Third, among people who do seek help for mental illness, psychiatrists and other 
mental health professionals cannot distinguish between those who are dangerous and those 
who are not. Fourth, people who have been identified as dangerous and barred from 
purchasing a gun may prevail on someone who can pass a background check to serve as a 
“straw purchaser,” that is, to purchase the gun for him. Police sting operations have shown 
that some licensed gun dealers readily sell a gun to A even when they know all of the 
following three things: A is serving as a straw purchaser for B, B is legally barred from 
                                                          
47 For example, Philip Cook and Kristin Goss, use the terms “good guys” and “bad guys” to describe the U.S. model 
and recognize that other nations employ the other, more effective model, but nevertheless restrict themselves to 
making proposals to improve the fatally-flawed model. Cook & Gross, 55, 118, and 214-20, respectively.   
48 Sharon LaFraniere & Emily Palmer, “In 130 of Worst Shootings, Vision of Porous Gun Laws, New York Times, 
Oct. 22, 2016, at A1. 
12 
 
purchasing a gun, and B intends to use the gun to commit a crime.49 And, of course, there 
are grossly irresponsible private, unlicensed sellers too. The two teenagers who committed 
the Columbine High School massacre, and were a year too young to legally purchase long 
guns, recruited an eighteen-year-old to purchase two shotguns and a semiautomatic rifle 
from a private seller at a gun show for them.50 
     
IV. 
 We shall now more broadly examine gun violence in America. 
 There were, according to the FBI Uniform Crime Reports, 13,455 murders in the United 
States in 2015.51 The most commonly-used weapons were firearms; they accounted for 9,616 
– 71.5 percent – of all murders in the U.S. And the most commonly-used type of firearm 
were handguns. In fact, handguns were used to commit at least 6,447 murders – 67 percent 
of all firearm homicides and 48 percent of all homicides. I say “at least” because we do not 
know what type of firearm was used for 2,648 murders. We do know that long guns – 
shotguns and rifles – were used to commit 521 murders, which represent less than four 
percent of all homicides. If we assume the division between handguns and long guns for the 
category “other guns or type not stated” in the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports is in the same 
proportion as when the type of firearm used was known and reported, then handguns 
accounted for about 61 percent of all murders in the United States. The next most commonly 
used weapons are knives or cutting instruments, which account for approximately 11 percent 
of all murders in the U.S. That is followed by personal weapons (hands and feet) and blunt 
objects, which, respectively, are used to commit roughly four percent and three percent of 
all murders. Other weapons combined – including poison, explosives, being pushed or 
thrown out of a window, and fire – account for well under one percent of all murders. This 
has long been the U.S. pattern. 52 So handguns are, by far, the instruments most commonly 
used to commit murder in the United States. 
 In what types of situations do handgun-related murders occur? According to the FBI, 
about 17 percent of all handgun murders in 2015 occurred in connection with a felony or 
suspected felony – such as robbery, rape, and narcotics violations – while about 23 percent 
occurred during arguments or brawls.53 These were followed by juvenile gang killings and 
gangland killings, which, respectively, constituted about nine percent and two percent of 
handgun-related homicides. Law enforcement did not know the circumstances in which 
about 38 percent of all handgun-related murders were committed. For these purposes, 
however, we cannot reasonably assume that the circumstances in the unknown category 
mirror those in the known categories. Perhaps a higher proportion of murders that occurred 
in unknown circumstances arose from robberies and other felonies than from arguments, 
brawls, and romantic triangles than was the case when police were able to discern the 
                                                          
49 Hemenway, Private Guns, Public Health, 142-43. 
50 Henigan, 36-39. 
51 FBI, “Crime in the U.S. 2015,” Expanded Homicide Data Table 9. The full report is available at 
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2015/crime-in-the-u.s.-2015. 
52 See Carl T. Bogus, “Gun Control and America’s Cities: Public Policy and Politics,” Albany Government Law 
Review 1:440, 447 (2008) and sources cited therein. 
53 FBI, Crime in the U.S. 2015, Expanded Homicide Data Table 11. 
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circumstances of the killing. A reasonable guess might be that there is a roughly equal 
division between handgun murders that occur during other crimes and those that arise out of 
arguments, brawls, romantic triangles, and the like. 
 The FBI also reports that, among all of the 13,455 murders in 2015, 1,721 victims (12.8 
percent) were family member of the perpetrator, 1,013 (7.5 percent) were a friend, boyfriend, 
or – most commonly – a girlfriend of the perpetrator, and 2,801 (20.8 percent) were an 
acquaintance of the perpetrator.54 These three categories – relative, friend, and acquaintance 
– are all somewhat larger than the numbers suggest because in many instances the police are 
unable to identify the perpetrator. The rough rules of thumb used by criminologists and 
sociologists familiar with these data is that in about half of homicides the perpetrator and 
victim knew each other, about a quarter of all female victims are killed by husbands and 
boyfriends, and about one-third of all homicides arise from arguments.55  
  The largest category of gun violence is suicide. According to the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC), there were 21,334 suicides by firearms in the United States 
in 2014 (the latest year for which the CDC has supplied data).56 While the CDC does not 
report the type of firearm, handguns are almost always the type of firearm used, both because 
they are more prevalent and because of the physical difficulty of using a long gun to shoot 
oneself. 
 The smallest category of gun fatalities are accidents. About six-hundred people die 
annually from unintentional shootings.57 But while a relatively small category in terms of 
the total number of fatalities, it is a poignant category nonetheless because it includes, on 
average, 62 children age 14 or younger per year.58 Many of these are quite young – children 
who find a parent’s handgun in a nightstand drawer or under socks in a bedroom dresser and 
accidently kill themselves, siblings, and playmates.      
 Of course, many shootings are not fatal. In 2010, hospital emergency rooms treated 
73,505 nonfatal gunshot injuries.59 These include gunshots resulting from murder attempts, 
robberies, assaults, accidents, and suicide attempts. Firearms, therefore, impose a heavy 
financial cost on the U.S. health care system. Firearms were also used to commit 123,358 
robberies and 170,941 aggravated assaults in the U.S. during 2015.60 That accounts for about 
41 percent all robberies and nearly a quarter of all aggravated assaults.61 Guns, therefore, 
have an impact on American life that extends well beyond the numbers of people who are 
killed and injured. 
 So far have we have been examining the cost side of the ledger. Let’s now turn to the 
benefit side: how often handguns and other firearms are used in self-defense. This is a subject 
                                                          
54 FBI, Crime in the U.S. 2015, Expanded Homicide Data Table 10. 
55 See, e.g., Anthony A. Braga & Philip J. Cook, “The Criminal Records of Gun Offenders,” Georgetown Journal of 
Law & Public Policy 14:1, 7 (2016). 
56 https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/suicide.htm 
57 See Cook & Goss, 34 (reporting that 606 unintentional firearm-related killings in 2010), and Henigan, 71-72 
(reporting “almost 3,800” accidental gun fatalities from 2005-2010).   
58 Henigan, 72 (reporting data from a six-year CDC study). 
59 Cook & Goss, 34. 
60 FBI, Crime in the U.S. 2015, Table 15. 
61 FBI, Crime in the U.S. 2015, Robbery Table 3 and Aggravated Assault Table. 
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of hot debate. The NRA and its allies claim that guns are frequently used for self-defense 
and prevent many crimes – most often by merely brandishing a gun and frightening a robber 
or attacker away. That is a convenient claim because it largely relies on unverified stories 
by gun owners. For example, a gun owner says that he heard someone attempting to break 
into his home at night. He got his gun and shouted, “Come in at your own risk. I am armed!” 
He then heard footsteps running away. Or a gun owner claims he was walking alone at night 
when a menacing-looking individual crossed the street in his direction, apparently bent upon 
robbery. The gun owner drew his previously-concealed handgun from its holster and 
displayed it to the approaching individual, who promptly turned tail and ran away. Such 
stories are legion. Even assuming good faith by a story-teller, how do we know whether he 
was mistaken about the intent of the person he frightened away? To take a famous situation, 
George Zimmerman may have been convinced in his mind that he was a law-abiding citizen 
and Treyvon Martin was a dangerous criminal, yet things surely appeared quite different to 
Treyvon Martin. In a study conducted by a researcher at the Harvard School of Public Health, 
a panel of judges reviewed incidents in which gun owners said they fired a single shot in 
self-defense. The judges concluded that in a majority of those incidents the action was not, 
in fact, a legitimate act of self-defense.62   
 We do, however, have hard data that can give us a better idea about how often guns are 
used in self-defense, namely, the number of justifiable homicides in which handguns were 
used. Unlike unverified stories about brandishing a gun, when someone is shot and killed 
there is a dead body and a police investigation. According to the FBI, private handguns were 
used in 215 justifiable homicides in 2015.63 (Long guns were used in just 21 justifiable 
homicides.) Justifiable homicides occur when someone reasonably believes it is necessary 
to use deadly force in defense of himself or someone else. Of course, not every use of 
handgun for self-defense results in a fatality. It is reasonable to assume that the rule of thumb 
that there are five to seven non-fatal injuries for every fatal gun injury applies.64 And there 
are surely occasions when merely brandishing a weapon is, by itself, an effective mode of 
self-defense. Nevertheless, comparing the number of justifiable handgun homicides to 
handgun murders is extremely useful in making a cost-benefit analysis of handguns in 
America. To repeat the figures, there were 215 justifiable homicides and 6,447 murders 
committed with handguns in 2015. Thus, 96.8 percent of all of the killings committed with 
handguns were murders. This is, of course, not the whole story; but it gives us a solid apple-
to-apple comparison. 
 Also on the benefit side of the ledger are the feelings of security that handguns give 
their owners. It must be noted, however, that as comforting as those feelings may be, they 
provide gun owners with a false sense of security. Most Americans who own handguns do 
so for self-defense. Undoubtedly, they believe they are making a prudent decision to protect 
themselves and their families, but data suggest otherwise. Another study has shown that for 
each incident in which a gun in the home was used to shoot an intruder, there are four 
accidental shootings of members of their households or their guests, seven criminal assaults 
or homicides, and eleven attempted or completed suicides.65 Having a gun at home increases 
                                                          
62 See Cook & Goss, 19-20 (describing a study conducted by David Hemenway).  
63 FBI, Crime in the U.S. 2015, Expanded Homicide Data Table 15. 
64 Spitzer, 54. 
65 Henigan, 116-17. 
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the chance of successful suicide in that home by a factor of five.66 Teenagers are especially 
at risk. Many teens go through periods of angst and depression, and a gun is all too easy to 
grab and use in a moment of even brief despair. Moreover, once the trigger is pulled, there 
is no turning back as sometimes happens when someone swallows pills or sits in a running 
automobile in a closed garage.    
 The gun lobby has long argued that guns in the home deter home invasions or “hot 
burglaries,” i.e., burglaries occurring when homeowners are present. The theory is that 
burglars do not want to be confronted by armed homeowners. Thus, burglars seek to avoid 
neighborhoods where they believe there are a higher proportion of armed homeowners, work 
harder to ensure the home is unoccupied before burglarizing it, or are more likely to take up 
other lines of work in states and regions with high rates of gun ownership. The theory may 
be superficially appealing, but it is not supported by the data. First, guns in the home are 
rarely used against intruders. In one study, researchers working with the police found that in 
only three out of 198 instances (1.5%) of unwanted home entries that occurred in Atlanta 
over a three-month period were handguns used in self-defense.67 Second, according 
to one study, hot burglary rates increase rather than decrease along with the prevalence of 
gun ownership.68 A ten-percent increase in gun ownership appeared to increase burglary 
rates by three to seven percent. 
 I suspect that even if gun owners knew all of these data, many would nonetheless feel 
confident that owning a handgun is a prudent decision for them and their families. Tragedies 
happen to less careful people. Just as ninety percent of all drivers believe they are better than 
average, most gun owners must surely believe that they are more trustworthy than the 
average gun owner.69 Jamie Gilt, a 31-year-old gun activist in Jacksonville, Florida, may 
have been just such a person. Jamie maintained a Facebook page titled “Jamie Gilt for Gun 
Sense,” on which she ridiculed the idea of relying on the police for protection instead of 
owing a gun.70 Her whole family knew how to shoot, Jamie noted, adding, “Even my 4-year-
old gets jacked up to target shoot the .22.” On Monday, March 7, 2016, while Jamie was 
driving a pickup truck, her four-year-old son who was sitting in the backseat accidentally 
shot Jamie with a handgun. The bullet entered Jamie’s back and exited the front of her torso. 
A police officer quickly came to the rescue when he observed Jamie behaving frantically 
inside the truck. Fortunately, Jamie survived. 
  
V. 
  We shall now examine the existing system of firearm regulation in the United States. 
                                                          
66 Ibid. See also Matthew Miller, et al., Firearm and Suicide in the United States: Is Risk Independent of Underlying 
Suicidal Behavior? American Journal of Epidemiology 178:946, 951 (2013)(finding that “higher rates of firearm 
ownership are associated with higher rates of overall suicide, but not with nonfirearm suicide.”)   
67 Henigan, 116-17. 
68 Ibid., 105-06 (describing study by Cook and Ludwig).. 
69 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2011), 259-60 [273 of Nook 
version]. 
70Joe Daraskevich, “Woman tells Putnam County deputy that son, 4, shot her in back while she was driving,” 
Florida Times Union, March 8, 2016, available at http://jacksonville.com/2016-05-02/stub-3. 
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 Federal law requires that people wishing to purchase a firearm – handgun, rife, or 
shotgun – from licensed gun dealer fill out a Firearms Transaction Form and have their 
names run through the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS), which 
is operated by the FBI. In the main, the system is designed to prevent sales to people who 
have been convicted of a felony; people who have been convicted of domestic violence 
misdemeanor or are under a restraining order; people adjudicated to be “a mental defective” 
or involuntarily committed to a mental institution; drug addicts; aliens unlawfully in the 
U.S.; fugitives from justice; and people dishonorably discharged from the armed forces.71 In 
the good guy/bad guy model, these are the bad guys. Everyone else over 18 years of age may 
purchase a long gun, and those 21 or older may purchase a handgun. Under federal law, 
background checks must be completed within three days although nearly all checks are 
completed within just seconds. There are some additional state restrictions – most notably, 
about a dozen states require a license or permit to own a handgun.72 
 For political reasons, the system has enormous loopholes. Most significantly, only sales 
by licensed gun dealers are covered. Private sales are exempt under federal law. These 
include, notoriously, sales made by private sellers at the 4,000 gun shows that are held 
annually across the country. Private sellers constitute between a quarter and a half of all gun 
sellers at gun shows.73 No one really knows what portion of all firearm sales are private and 
therefore take place without background checks. According to a rather old survey, 40 percent 
of all gun sales are private. In a more recent survey of prison inmates who used a gun in their 
most recent crime, only one in nine (11%) said they bought the gun from a store or a 
pawnshop, which are general the venues licensed gun dealers. Only sixteen states require 
background checks for private handgun sales, and only six states require background checks 
for private sales of all firearms, including long guns.74   
 Another strange aspect of federal law is that all federal records background check 
records, including the Firearm Transaction Form filled out and signed by the purchaser, must 
be destroyed within twenty-four hours of a completed gun sale.75 The reason for the 
requirement is that the NRA is adamantly opposed to any records of gun ownership so that, 
should the government fall into tyrannical hands, it would not have records to aid it in gun 
confiscation.76 However, destroying these records makes it all but impossible to prosecute 
purchasers who lie on those forms in order to buy guns. 
 Moreover, federal firearm laws have been deliberately designed to make research about 
gun regulation in the United States by criminologists, public health experts, and others more 
difficult. In 1995, Congress directed that $2.6 million that had been budgeted for gun-related 
research by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) be used instead for other 
purposes, and it has since repeatedly instructed that no CDC research money may be “used 
                                                          
71 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). For good descriptions of the system, see Cook & Goss, 101-18; Henigan, 143-46 and 205-06; 
Spitzer, 158-64.  
72 Cook snd Goss, 107. 
73 Ibid., 81. 
74 Ibid., 144. 
75 Henigan, 144-46. 
76 For more about the view that the Second Amendment exists as a check on government tyranny, see Carl T. Bogus 
“Heller and Insurrectionism,” Syracuse Law Review 59:255 (2008). 
17 
 
to advocate or promote gun control.”77 Note that Congress’ direction was not evenhanded; 
it did not say, for example, that CDC funds could not be used to advocate for or against gun 
control, or to promote any position regarding gun control. Not only CDC but researchers 
based at universities who routinely obtain federal grants to study crime or public health 
issues got the message: stop doing research related to firearms or risk forfeiting federal 
research grants of all kinds. This effectively stopped federally-sponsored gun research for 
more than a decade. 
 In 2009, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) began to make small but regular 
research grants related to guns. At the behest of the NRA, Congress also passed legislation 
designed to foreclose another promising area of research related to ATF traces of guns used 
in crimes. When police recover a gun at a crime scene, ATF initiates a trace, using the 
weapon’s serial number, to follow the gun from manufacturer, to distributor, to dealer, to the 
person who purchased the gun from the dealer. Using trace data, researchers discovered that 
a disproportionate number of crime guns were being sold by a relatively few gun shops. In 
fact, the data were astonishing: one percent of licensed gun dealers were selling nearly 60 
percent of the guns ultimately used in crimes.78 This presented a new area of inquiry: could 
gun crimes be reduced by eliminating “bad apple” dealers or otherwise improving the 
distribution chain? Continuing its three-monkey approach – see no evil, hear no evil, speak 
no evil – Congress, in 2003, enacted legislation that effectively prohibits ATF from 
disclosing trace data, even non-individual aggregated data, to the public.79 
 The NRA, and thus Congress, wants as weak and ineffective an ATF as possible. 
Congress expressly prohibits AFT from conducting more than one unannounced visit of a 
gun dealer per year – no matter how questionable the history of the dealer – and the funding 
that Congress provides is barely sufficient to allow ATF to visit a gun dealer, on average, 
every five years.80 Congress forbids ATF from computerizing trace data; all traces have to 
be conducted by hand. And Congress prohibits ATF from requiring that dealers maintain an 
inventory, which, of course, makes it difficult or impossible for ATF to tell whether a 
dealer’s guns are being stolen, lost, or deliberately diverted to the black market.  
 Let’s assume, for the sake of argument, that the loopholes could be closed and the 
political obstacles removed. Suppose the law required that all gun sales in all states – whether 
made by licensed dealers or private sellers* – were subject to NICS background checks? 
Suppose the ATF were adequately funded and permitted to inspect dealers as reasonably 
necessary to ensure, as much as possible, compliance with law. Suppose record reporting 
were improved to ensure, as much as possible, that relevant criminal and mental health 
records were timely entered into the system. If it were improved as much as possible, would 
the basic regulatory model we have be adequate to reasonably protect America from gun 
violence? 
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* About one-third of the states require that private sales also go through the background check system. To 
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 The answer is no. Even with a perfect record system covering all gun sales, the good 
guy/bad guy model will not do the job. Let’s start with the criminal side. Only 40 percent of 
people convicted of murder had prior felony records.81 Moreover, even if we require that all 
private sales be subject to background checks, people with felony records will still borrow 
guns from friends and family members, steal guns, and purchase them on the black market. 
When surveyed, only 20 percent of prisoners say they purchased the gun they used for the 
last crime from a store.82  Things are even bleaker on the mental health side. As previously 
mentioned, only a small fraction of people who commit murder are mentally ill. There are 
some serious mental illnesses such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and severe depression 
that are associated with increased risks of violent behavior, but one study found that only 
seven percent of people who were hospitalized for these conditions were hospitalized 
involuntarily, and, under current federal law, only that subgroup is ineligible to purchase or 
own a firearm.83 Even if the NICS records and federal law were to be expanded broadly to 
prohibit everyone suffering from a severe mental illness from owning a gun – regardless of 
whether they were hospitalized involuntarily, or even hospitalized at all – the records will 
still be woefully over-inclusive and under-inclusive. On the one hand, only a fraction of 
people with serious mental illness will ever wind up in the NICS; and on the other hand the 
vast majority of people will serious mental illnesses are not violent. Moreover, it is estimated 
that only five percent of violent crimes are committed by people with serious mental 
illness.84 (At present, we are making it easier for mentally ill people to buy guns. At the 
NRA’s behest, Congress passed and President Donald J. Trump signed legislation abolishing 
a federal regulation that required the Social Security Administration to report to the NICS 
people who receive disability checks because they are mentally disabled or unable to handle 
their own financial affairs.85)   
 Currently, most states require psychotherapists to report patients who present a serious 
danger of violence to an identifiable individual.86 This generally means that a 
psychotherapist must report a patient who expressly says he intends to harm a specific 
person. A few states require psychotherapists to also report individuals who they believe 
present a serious danger to society at large, regardless of whether they have said they want 
                                                          
81 Cook & Goss, 56. This does not mean, however, that 60 percent of murders would have been eligible under 
federal law to purchase a gun. About 37 percent of persons arrested for murder, robbery, assault, or illegal gun 
possession would have been eligible to purchase a gun under federal law. Braga & Cook, “The Criminal Records of 
Gun Offenders,” 2. 
82 Ibid., 57. 
83 Ibid., 149. 
84 Ibid., 72. 
85 The regulation was promulgated in the waning days of the Obama administration. It is estimated that about 75,000 
people are categorized as mentally disabled or unable to handle their own financial affairs. President Trump signed 
the legislation abolishing the regulation on February 28, 2017. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/daily-202/2017/03/03/daily-202-what-trump-didn-t-
want-you-to-see-him-signing/58b923fae9b69b1406c75d33/?utm_term=.43032ede9038 
86 Most of these statutes were stimulated by and follow the reasoning of Tarasoff v. Regents of University of 
California , 17 Cal.3d 425 (1976), involving a patient who told his psychotherapist that he intended to kill someone 
who he did, in fact, later murder. A duty to report only arises when the psychotherapist believes a particular patient 
presents a serious danger of violence to a readily-identifiable victim. Some have advocated broadening that rule. 
E.g., Sally Satel, “Loosen Restrictions for Therapists to Report Danger,” New York Times, Aug. 20, 2013, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/05/29/can-therapists-prevent-violence/loosen-restrictions-for-
therapists-to-report-danger. 
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to harm a particular individual. Either way, this is very different than reporting all patients 
with serious mental illness. Requiring psychotherapists to report to the government everyone 
with a serious mental illness who comes to them for help, regardless of whether the 
psychotherapist has reason to believe the particular patient is dangerous, would likely to do 
more far harm than good. It would discourage people from seeking treatment, and it would 
weaken the patients’ trust in their relationships with their psychotherapists, which are 
essential to successful treatment. Discouraging people with serious mental illnesses from 
getting treatment is hardly a recipe for improving public health and safety. 
 Scientists have begun to identify genes that are associated with violent behavior.87 
Suppose, for the sake of argument, they get much better at this – so much better that a DNA 
test can identify people who are likely to commit violent acts in the future. Should such 
individuals be prohibited from buying or possessing a firearm, even if they have not yet 
committed a violent act? In view of the fact that the Supreme Court has held that people 
have a constitutional right to own handguns, it would, a matter of law, be extremely difficult 
to deny that right to people who have, to date, been law-abiding citizens. If we can deny 
them that constitutional right, is not the next logical step preventive detention?88 
 Thus, for a host of reasons – involving law, public policy, fundamental American 
values, medical ethics, sociology, and much more – the good guy/bad guy model is never 
going to be adequate to the task, even if it is improved as much as practicably possible. It 
should be no surprise, therefore, that the best evidence is that gun control measures based on 
that system have been ineffective. 
 The statutory genesis of our current federal system was the Brady Handgun Prevention 
Act of 1994. That law imposed a five-day waiting period for handgun purchases. The 
purpose was two-fold: (1) to provide a cooling-off period for people who may be purchasing 
handguns because they were angry at someone and intending harm, and (2) to have local 
police conduct a background check of putative handgun purchasers during the waiting 
period.89 When the law went into effect, 18 states already had similar laws in place. This set 
up something of a natural experiment to measure the efficacy of the Brady Act. Crime rises 
and falls for a many reasons, so just seeing whether homicide rates increased or declined 
after the law went into effect would not tell us much. A crime decrease may have happened 
anyway. However, researchers were able to compare the 32 states with new waiting periods 
and background checks with the 18 states that already had such requirements to see whether 
there were greater changes in one group of states than the other. They discovered that the 
average homicide rates in both groups followed nearly exactly the same trajectories.90 There 
was no discernable impact of the Brady Act on crime rates. 
                                                          
87 Melissa Hogenboom, “Two genes linked with violent crime, BBC News, Oct. 28, 2014, available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-29760212. 
88 Not everyone is horrified by preventive detention. See, e.g., Adam Klein & Benjamin Wittes, “Preventive 
Detention in American Theory and Practice,” Harvard National Security Journal 2:85 (2011), available at 
http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Preventative-Detention-in-American-Theory-and-Practice.pdf. 
89 By its original terms, the five-day waiting period was to be replaced by the NICS within a ten years. In 1997, the 
Supreme Court held that the federal government could not require state and local police to conduct background 
checks of putative handgun purchasers Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898 (1997).   
90 Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, “The Limited Impact of the Brady Bill: Evaluation and Implication,” in Reducing 
Gun Violence in America, 2. See also Cook & Goss, 142-43. But see Michael Luca, et al., “Handgun waiting periods 
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 Further research has confirmed that the Brady Act has no discernable effect on reducing 
criminal violence by purchasers who were blocked from purchasing a gun because of their 
previous criminal histories. Researchers found evidence that the Act might have had “some 
positive effect” among purchasers who were disqualified exclusively by their mental health 
histories, that is, people with serious mental illness and without criminal records.91 But that 
is a pretty small subgroup. In the study, it comprised only five percent of the people blocked 
from purchasing a gun.   
 The fact that the Brady Act is not associated with a decline in homicides often surprises 
gun control advocates. On its website, the Brady Campaign to Prevent Handgun Violence, 
which was the principal advocate for the Brady Act, makes the following claim: “Since the 
Brady law took effect in 1994, over 2.4 million prohibited purchases have been blocked and 
countless lives have been saved.”92 It is true that 2.4 million sales by licensed gun dealers 
were blocked because purchasers were determined to be ineligible to purchase a gun, but it 
is, I believe, nothing more than an assumption that the blocked sales saved lives – at least as 
a result of homicides, robberies, and criminal assault. That is why, I suspect, the Brady 
Campaign says that “countless” lives were saved, without any supporting citation. The most 
obvious explanation as to why blocked sales do not appear to translate into saved lives is 
that buyers turned away by licensed dealers get guns elsewhere. While we do not know how 
often such buyers are redirected to private sellers or the black market, there is plenty of 
anecdotal evidence of people shopping at guns shows being turned away by licensed dealers 
and immediately going to unlicensed dealers at adjacent tables.93         
 This does not mean, however, that effective gun control is impossible. Other nations 
have it. They have reduced firearm homicides to a tiny fraction of what we experience in the 
United States, and as a result their total homicides rates are also much lower than ours. I do 
not say “as a result” blithely, but before speaking of cause and effect let’s look at some data. 
                                                          
reduce gun deaths,” PNAS Early Edition, Sept. 21, 2017, available at 
http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2017/10/11/1619896114.full (finding that waiting periods reduce gun homicides 
by 17% and gun suicides by 7-11%). Luca looked at the same data as Cook and Ludwig, but he coded some key data 
differently. At the time of this writing, other researchers have not yet commented on the differences between the 
Cook-Ludwig and Luca studies.   
91 Swanson, et al., “Preventing Gun Violence Involving People with Serious Mental Illness,” 45. 
92 http://www.bradycampaign.org/bradys-solutions-0 
93 Garen J. Wintemute, “Broadening Denial Criteria for the Purchase and Possession of Firearms: Need, Feasibility, 
and Effectiveness,” in Reducing Gun Violence in America, 77, 84. 
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 In the chart above, the first bar for each nation is the firearm homicide rate, the second 
bar is the non-firearm homicide rate, and the third bar is the total homicide rate.94 The first 
bar for the United Kingdom is not missing; you cannot see it because the firearm homicide 
rate was zero. The firearm death rate for the United States towers above the other three 
countries: the U.S. rate is more than seven times the next highest rate. By contrast, the non-
firearm homicide rate in the United States of is not even twice the Canadian rate. As one can 
clearly see, that towering third bar of total homicides in the United States is comprised, in 
the main, of the first bar – homicides with guns. 
 Franklin E. Zimring and Gordon Hawkins have convincingly demonstrated that the 
United States is not exceptional because Americans are more violent than citizens in other 
affluent countries. Rates of robberies and assaults in America are not far different than in 
other affluent nations. For example, during their study period the assault rates for Canada 
and England were within 30 percent of the U.S. rate, while the assault rate in Austria was a 
bit more than 30 percent above the U.S. rate. What makes America so different is its 
extraordinarily high rate of lethal violence, and what makes violence in America lethal so 
much more often is its much higher prevalence of guns. Guns are, quite simply, far more 
lethal than other weapons. The robbery rates in Canada, England, and Australia were, for the 
year studied, within 30 percent of the U.S. rate.95  Robberies, however, are more likely to 
turn deadly when they are at gun point. It is so much easier to shoot a victim who resists, or 
flees, or whom the robber just does not like than it is to stab or bludgeon him, and someone 
who is shot is more likely to die than someone who is stabbed or bludgeoned. Guns are used 
                                                          
94 The data is derived from Erin Grinshteyn & David Hemenway, “Violent Death Rates: The US Compared with 
Other High-income OECD Countries, 2010,” The American Journal of Medicine 129:266 (2016). 
95 Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Crime is Not the Problem: Lethal Violence in America (New York: 
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in in about 40 percent of New York robberies yet accounted for 85 percent of robbery 
killings.96 The same dynamic plays out in assaults.97 Guns are used in 26 percent of assaults 
in New York but only one percent of assaults in London.98 Consider that last statistic, and 
then look again at the bars depicting the homicide rates in the United States and the United 
Kingdom.  
 Zimring and Hawkins compared crime in Los Angeles, California with crime in Sydney, 
Australia, and crime in New York City with crime in London, England.99 Los Angeles and 
Sydney both had populations of 3.6 million during the study period, and they had roughly 
similar rates of theft and burglary. And yet, Sydney’s robbery rate was only 12.5 percent of 
that of Los Angeles, and its homicide rate was only 4.8 percent of that of Los Angeles. Thus, 
as Zimring and Hawkins put it, “for every homicide reported in Sydney, twenty bodies are 
added to the count in Los Angeles.” 100 During the study period, New York City’s population 
was seven million and London’s was 6.6 million. London’s theft and burglary rates were, 
respectively, 166.5 percent and 157 percent of New York’s. However, London’s robbery 
rate was 19.4 percent of New York’s rate, and its homicide rate was only 8.9 percent of New 
York’s rate. Thus, even though London’s burglary and theft rates were higher than New 
York’s rates, New York’s robbery rate was five times London’s, and New York’s murder 
was more than eleven times London’s rate. 
 One famous study by other researchers examined crime over a seven-year period in both 
Seattle, Washington and Vancouver, British Columbia.101 During the study period, these two 
cities – located 140 miles apart – were nearly identical in population size, unemployment 
rate, and median household income. They had strong cultural similarities as well; for 
example, a majority of the top-ten rated television shows were the same in both cities. As 
one might expect of twin cities, the burglary rates in Seattle and Vancouver were nearly 
identical. The aggravated assault rate was slightly higher in Seattle, but when researchers 
examined that more closely they found something quite interesting. The aggravated assault 
rates with knives were almost identical. So were the aggravated assault rates with all other 
weapons besides firearms. However, Seattle’s rate of aggravated assaults with firearms was 
nearly eight times Vancouver’s rate. The murder rates between the cities were very different. 
In fact, there were nearly twice as many murder in Seattle than in Vancouver over the study 
period. The pattern here was much the same: the murder rates with knives, and with all other 
weapons other than firearms, were quite close, but Seattle’s homicide firearm rate was nearly 
five times Vancouver’s rate. The most salient difference between the two cities was the 
prevalence of handguns: 41 percent of Seattle households handguns compared to 12 percent 
of Vancouver households. 
                                                          
96 Ibid., 45. 
97 The researchers note that in Los Angeles, for example, a far greater proportion of homicides “grow out of 
arguments and other social encounters between acquaintances” than out of robbery. Ibid., 16.  
98 Ibid., 47. 
99 Ibid., 4-7. 
100 Ibid., 16. 
101 John Henry Sloan, et., al., “Handgun Regulations, Crime, Assaults, and Homicide,” The New England Journal of 
Medicine, Nov. 10, 1988, 1256-62. See also discussion in Carl T. Bogus, “The Strong Case for Gun Control,” The 
American Prospect, Summer 1992, 19. 
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 More than anything else, the prevalence of guns that accounts for the disjunction 
between the relative similarity in non-lethal crimes and the yawning chasm in lethal crimes 
when comparing the United States to other affluent nations. Other international comparisons 
have found that major gun laws reduce homicides while modest regulations do not.102 And 
researchers have discovered that, within the United States, residents of states with higher 
gun prevalence are more likely to be murdered than residents of states with lower gun 
prevalence.103 Indeed, residents of states with the very highest gun prevalence (Louisiana, 
Alabama, Mississippi, Wyoming, West Virginia, and Arkansas) are 2.5 times more likely to 
be homicide victims than are residents of states with the very lowest gun prevalence (Hawaii, 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New Jersey).104 
 “No program for the prevention of lethal violence can possess even superficial 
credibility without paying sustained attention to guns,” wrote Zimring and Hawkins.105 “The 
basic choice,” they continued, “is between trying to deny handguns to only high-risk groups 
and attempting to curtail the availability of handguns generally.”106 That is, the U.S. follows 
the good guy/bad guy model, which allows everyone except those in prohibited categories 
to own firearms while other high-income nations allow only people in certain special 
categories to own firearms. Zimring and Hawkins recognized that the choice is either to 
bring “U.S. handgun policy to the standard of the rest of the developed world” or be content 
with making “minor adjustments to current regulations that will all but guarantee persisting 
high rates of death.”107 It was, they observed, an “unpalatable” choice – unpalatable for 
reasons of public opinion and politics. 
 Since they made that observation, the option of joining the rest of the world seems even 
more unrealistic. Constitutional law has become as a second obstacle. It is entirely 
understandable that gun control advocacy groups today try to content themselves with 
fighting off ever more radical proposals by the gun lobby – such as requiring states to honor 
concealed weapon permits issued by other states, or making gun silencers legal108 – or 
seeking modifications in the existing good guy/bad guy model. And yet, as I shall explain 
shortly, that strategy is counterproductive because it accepts and entrenches the good 
guy/bad guy model. I am not arguing that we can overthrow the good guy/bad guy model 
and join the rest of the developed world soon. Rather, I shall argue that we must take a long-
term view. Neither public opinion nor constitutional law is unalterable. Both can be changed 
through concerted and sustained effort. 
 It was, not that long ago, settled constitutional law that the Second Amendment only 
grants the people a right to keep and bear arms only within the government-regulated militia. 
The higher federal courts, including the United States Supreme Court, had consistently so 
held throughout American jurisprudential history, and all legal commentators agreed. And 
yet, beginning in the 1970s, the NRA and its allies launched a campaign to change that basic 
                                                          
102 Hemenway, Private Guns, Public Health, 169-70. 
103 Henigan, 103. 
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105 Ibid., 200. 
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107 Ibid.,. 201. 
108 See Robert Spitzer, “Silencing lifesaving noise,” Washington Post, Jan. 25, 2017, A17 (regarding a NRA push to 
eliminate registration requirements for owning gun silencers). 
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understanding. They knew this was not an easy task; they knew it would take sustained effort 
over considerable time. I have told some of the story elsewhere.109 Suffice it to say here that 
they proceeded incrementally, gained momentum slowly but continuously, and succeeded 
with a dramatic reversal of Supreme Court precedent. It took almost thirty years. Had they 
contented themselves with easier but less consequential short-term projects, Second 
Amendment jurisprudence would never have changed. 
 Can Second Amendment jurisprudence be changed again? If America is someday to 
have a rational public policy and reasonable public safety, it must be changed. Moreover, it 
can be changed without constitutional amendment because the historical background to the 
Second Amendment demonstrates that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Heller – the five-
to- four decision that reversed two centuries of precedent – was wrong. I shall next try to 
give you just a flavor of that history. 
          
VI. 
 Almost exactly one-hundred years before James Madison and the First Congress drafted 
the Second Amendment, the English Parliament included a right-to-possess-arms provision 
in its Bill of Rights of 1689. Although the English and American provisions are not identical, 
they were written to deal with parallel problems, namely, competing governmental 
authorities. Both were fundamentally separation of powers provisions. In England, the 
question was whether Parliament had the sole right to regulate guns, or whether the King 
could dispense with those laws; in America, it was whether the states had some minimum 
right to armed militia even though the newly-adopted Constitution gave Congress the sole 
authority to organize and arm the militia. 
 The English provision arose out of the Glorious Revolution of 1688. The genesis of the 
revolution was the ascension to the throne of King James II.110 That set England’s teeth on 
edge. Some years earlier, Parliament had enacted the Test Acts, which required that all 
political and military officials take an oath renouncing any belief in Catholicism.111 James, 
who was the brother of then-ruling King Charles II, shocked the nation by refusing to take 
the oath and instead resigning his position as Lord High Admiral. When Charles II died 
unexpectedly in 1685 without an heir, he was succeeded by James II. 
 Although historians estimate that England’s Catholic population was only between two 
and ten percent at the time, Protestant England nonetheless feared an attempt to restore the 
nation to Catholicism, whether by invasion or subversion. That is why Parliament enacted 
the Test Acts in the first place. James began ignoring the Test Acts by appointing Catholic 
army officers. While the King could “dispense” with the law under certain circumstances, 
                                                          
109 See Carl T. Bogus, “The History and Politics of Second Amendment Scholarship,” Chicago-Kent Law Review 
76:3 (2000). 
110 For an abbreviated history, see Carl T. Bogus, “The Hidden History of the Second Amendment,” U.C. 
Davis Law Review 31:309, 375-86 (1998). See also Lois G. Schwoerer, Gun Culture in Early Modern 
England (U. Va. Press 2016), at 156-70. 
111 The Test Act of 1673 required civil and military officers to “declare that I do believe that there is not any 
transubstantiation in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, or in the elements of the bread and wine, at or after the 
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many considered this an abuse of that authority. There was fear that James intended to disarm 
Protestants and arm Catholics by replacing Protestant military officers with Catholics, as 
James’ friend, the Earl of Tryronnel, was doing in Ireland. James, however, was fifty-five, 
then an advanced age, and neither hale nor hearty. His second wife was also Catholic, but 
she was believed to be infertile. Next in line to the throne was James’ daughter Mary. There 
was no problem there. Mary’s deceased mother, James’ first wife, had been a Protestant, and 
Mary’s husband – William of Orange, the Stadtholder of Holland – was the principal 
defender of Protestantism on the Continent. The hope, therefore, was that the danger posed 
by James II would be a fleeting one. 
 That hope was dashed in June of 1688 when the Queen gave birth to a baby boy, who 
by virtue of his gender became first in line to the throne. The prospect of a line of Catholic 
kings was intolerable. Precipitating what is known as the Glorious Revolution, leaders of 
Parliament invited William of Orange to invade England. William accepted the invitation. 
James II, finding himself with no support – political or military – in the face of Williams’ 
advancing army, fled to France. 
 Parliament then negotiated the terms under which it would offer William the throne.112 
It presented William with a Declaration of Rights, and asked him to accept it as a condition 
of being made King of England. Parliament wanted assurances that its lawmaking authority 
would be recognized and not curtailed. For example, the Declaration accused James II of  
“assuming and exercising a power of dispensing with and suspending of laws and the 
execution of laws without consent of Parliament,” and provided that “the pretended power 
of dispensing with laws or the execution of laws by regal authority, as it hath been assumed 
and exercised of late, is illegal.”113 Most relevant for our purposes, the Declaration accused 
James II of “causing several good subjects being Protestants to be disarmed at the same time 
when papists were both armed and employed contrary to law.” Article VII of the Declaration 
provided that “the subjects which are Protestants may have arms for their defence suitable 
to their conditions and as allowed by law.”∗ William accepted the Declaration, but insisted 
that he rule as King and not merely as Mary’s consort. Parliament agreed that William and 
Mary would be joint sovereigns but that William would administer the kingdom. When, ten 
months later, Parliament formally enacted the Declaration by statute, and it became the 
English Bill of Rights of 1689. 
 The right-to-have-arms provision of the Bill of Rights was not designed to grant the 
people a right to have weapons regardless of what Parliament might decide. It was precisely 
the opposite: it reaffirmed that firearm ownership was regulated by law, and that Parliament 
made the laws. Moreover, Parliament had long and vigorously regulated gun ownership and 
use in England. It had, for example, always restricted ownership of guns to the wealthy. In 
1523, Parliament made it unlawful for anyone with an annual income of less than 100£ – a 
considerable income at the time – to own a gun, a restriction that remained in place in 1689 
                                                          
112 Parliament sat as a Convention because Parliament could not be formally convened. 
113 English Bill of Rights of 1689, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/england.asp. 
∗ Parliament had no objection if the Mayor of London decided that public safety required disarming all Catholics in 
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and well beyond.114 Crossbows were similarly regulated. One of the reasons for allowing the 
wealthy to own handguns was that military officers were drawn from the aristocracy. 
(Proposals that officers should instead be appointed on the basis of competency or merit 
were repeatedly rejected. This lasted through World War I and even to some extent into 
World War II, when the aristocracy still provided a majority of military officers. The view 
was that a “British military officer should be a gentleman first and an officer second.”115) It 
was sensible that military officers be familiar with the handguns, which were their principal 
weapon, and the view, no doubt, was that gentlemen could be trusted with handguns. The 
gun laws were supplemented with game laws that made it unlawful for anyone except those 
meeting real property qualifications to either possess or use a gun for hunting. The game 
laws were designed to restrict hunting to the landed gentry – or, as one modern historian 
cleverly put it, the game laws “protected pheasants from peasants.”116 The laws regulating 
arms – guns and crossbows – were, of course, public safety measures.         
 It is quite interesting that even as early as the sixteenth century Parliament distinguished 
between what we today think of as handguns – that is, a gun small enough to conceal on 
one’s person – and longer guns, and between urban and rural areas. In 1541, Parliament 
noted that “little shorte handguns and little hagbuttes” were responsible for “destestable and 
shameful murders, robberies, felonies, riot and route,” and prohibited the possession of guns 
shorter than one yard in length. Residents living outside of urban areas were allowed to own 
guns of the prescribed length to protect their households, and residents living near the 
seacoast or the Scottish border were also permitted to own guns as a defense against 
invasion.117 Residents in urban areas with annual incomes of more than 10£ were required 
to own weapons to help provide for the national defense and public order, but they were 
required to keep those weapons in public storage facilities.118 
 Both the gun laws and the hunting laws were, of course, modified from time to time. 
The central point is this: Parliament vigorously regulated arms. There was no tradition of 
granting all subjects a right to own guns. Historian Lois Schwoerer writes: 
A striking feature of England’s early modern gun culture was its restrictive nature: 
English subjects whose socioeconomic standing was below a certain level (usually 
an annual income of £100) were legally disallowed to possess or use a firearm. This 
limit affected about 98 percent of the population.119 
 
 And Parliament wanted the King to acknowledge that it – that is, Parliament, as the law-
making body of the nation – had the sole authority to decide how arms were to be regulated. 
Prior to James II, there had been at least one previous episode of a king exercising his 
claimed dispensing power regarding Parliament’s gun laws. In 1544, while England was at 
                                                          
114 See Schwoerer, Gun Culture of in Early Modern England, at 48 and 162. The statute referred to handguns, but in 
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war with both Scotland and France, King Henry VII proclaimed that all native-born subjects 
could possess guns, notwithstanding any statute to the contrary.120 But that was during war, 
and it was brief; two years later the King rescinded that proclamation. James II’s program 
of disarming Protestants and arming Catholics was another matter entirely. Article VII was 
not intended to curtail gun regulation but to specify which branch of government had the 
authority to regulate guns. Its most salient phrase was as allowed by law, which meant that 
possession and use of arms was entirely contingent upon parliamentary regulation. The main 
point was to have the King accept that phrase.121 
 The American Founders were well aware of the English Bill of Rights, and it should not 
be a surprise that the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution was also a 
separation of powers provision. The new Constitution adopted by the Founders in 
Philadelphia on September 17, 1787 radically changed governmental authority over the 
militia. Previously, the militia had been creatures of the states. The Constitution changed 
that. It placed the militia under the joint control of the federal and state governments, but it 
gave the lion’s share of power to the federal government. Article I, Section 8, Clause 16 of 
the Constitution gave Congress the power: 
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing  
such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving 
to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of 
training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress. 
That meant that Congress could organize and govern the militia as it saw fit. Congress was 
also empowered to call forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union and to suppress 
insurrections and repel invasions. The states were left with only the power to appoint officers 
and to train the militia, although it had to train the militia as Congress would prescribe. 
Congress, moreover, was not required to rely principally on the militia for national defense. 
Although it had been a topic of some controversy in Philadelphia, the Constitution ultimately 
gave Congress the power to maintain standing armies and a navy. Congress was therefore 
free to decide to what extent it wanted to maintain a citizen militia. 
 I have told the remarkable story what of happened next at length elsewhere,122 and will 
give only a snapshot description here. When James Madison sought to have his home state 
of Virginia ratify the new Constitution at a convention in Richmond, Virginia in June of 
1788, his Antifederalist opponents – led by Patrick Henry and George Mason – accused him 
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of creating a militia clause that presented grave dangers for Virginia and the South. The 
Antifederalists accepted the representation that the Constitution did not give Congress the 
power to eliminate slavery – not directly, that is. But, they argued, the Constitution gave 
Congress the power to undermine the slave system by disarming the state militia, on which 
the South relied for slave control. Only Congress was empowered to arm the militia, they 
argued, and thus Congress could effectively disarm the militia. As everyone in Richmond 
well understood at the time, that would leave the South defenseless against slave revolts. 
(George Mason also argued that Congress might stimulate slave uprisings by, for example, 
sending Georgia’s militia to New Hampshire.) 
 Even with an armed and very present militia, the South then lived in constant terror of 
slave revolts.123 Henry and Mason’s suggestion that Congress might deprive Virginia of an 
armed militia had to be profoundly disturbing. They went as far as to suggest that Congress 
might deliberately disarm the militia to undermine the slave system. “Slavery is detested,” 
Patrick Henry reminded his audience.124 “The majority of Congress is to the north,” he 
added, “and the slaves are to the South.”125 When Madison tried to rebut these arguments by 
suggesting that if Congress did not arm the militia, the states could do so themselves, he was 
ridiculed. What did it mean to provide that Congress had specific powers over the militia 
and the states had other specific powers? Certainly that did not mean that all of those powers 
were concurrent between the national and state governments. 
 Madison and the Federalists ultimately prevailed, albeit only by a vote of 88 to 80, and 
Virginia ratified the Constitution and joined the Union. But, I believe, when Madison went 
off to the First Congress the following year representing Virginia in the House of 
Representatives politically committed to writing a Bill of Rights, he sought to fix the 
problem identified by Henry and Mason and to ensure that the states could have an armed 
militia regardless of Congress’ desire. 
 With all of this in mind, consider the words of the Second Amendment anew: “A well 
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to 
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” 
 
VII. 
 I shall conclude with two short, personal stories.  
 In 1987, I was elected to the board of directors of the organization that is known today 
as the Brady Campaign. It was then Handgun Control Inc. (HCI). At about the time I joined 
the board, HCI decided to make the Brady Bill its flagship objective. In its original form, the 
Brady Bill would have created a nationwide, seven-day waiting period for handgun 
purchases. I questioned the wisdom of that effort. Nearly half of the states already had 
waiting periods, some longer than seven days. California, I believe, had a fifteen-day waiting 
period. I knew of no data suggesting that waiting periods were effective in reducing handgun 
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deaths. Why, therefore, should we put all of our effort behind this proposal? The top officers 
believed that HCI needed a legislative victory to show its members it was making progress, 
and they wanted that victory in the next congressional session. The Brady Bill was so 
reasonable, so moderate, and so commonsensical that even the NRA could not oppose it 
without humiliating itself. The bill would breeze through the next session of Congress, they 
argued. 
 The NRA, however, did not seem embarrassed about opposing the bill. It did so with 
the same passion and fury it would have mustered if HCI had sought to confiscate all guns. 
In fact, that was pretty much the NRA argument: the Brady Bill was a ploy to get America 
to take a first step on a slippery slope that would eventually lead to banning guns. Not so, 
countered HCI. We favor only common-sense gun control measures. We do not support 
banning handguns. 
 Public opinion seemed to be overwhelmingly on HCI’s side. During the seven-year 
campaign, HCI provided its board members with every poll on the Brady Bill. My 
recollection is that national polls were consistently over 90 percent and over the entire seven 
years there was not a single state poll, even in states such as Virginia and Montana, in which 
less than 80 percent of respondents favored a seven-day waiting period for handgun 
purchases.126 That level of support was practically unheard of, then or now, for any issue. 
 Nevertheless, year after year the NRA successfully held off the legislation. The reason 
for its success was simple: while the overwhelming majority of people favored the bill, for 
them the issue was not do-or-die. It was not a decisive factor in the voting booth. Meanwhile, 
although the number of voters against a waiting period was relatively tiny, many of them 
considered the issue the most important issue of all. They told their congressional 
representatives that they would never again for vote for them if they voted for the Brady Bill, 
and they clearly meant it. I remember discussing the bill at the time with a Democratic 
congressman representing a mostly suburban Philadelphia district that stretched into rural 
areas. I told him that supporting the measure would cost him no more than one percent of 
the electorate. “Do you know what my margin was in the last election?” he asked. It had 
been less than one percent. “This is not an issue over which I am prepared to lose my seat,” 
he said. And why should it have been? There was evidence then (or now) that the Brady Bill 
would actually save lives. 
 The Brady Act was, of course, ultimately enacted in 1993. In fact, its passage did 
provide some political momentum; the following year a federal assault weapons ban was 
included in the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act. The argument for banning 
assault weapons was that there is no legitimate reason for private citizens to own military-
style weapons. The weapons were defined by certain features, including whether they had a 
pistol grip, flash suppressor, barrel shroud, folding stock, or bayonet mount. A gun 
containing at least two of nineteen specified features was deemed to be an assault weapon. 
The NRA argued that the objection to these weapons was merely cosmetic; they might look 
more dangerous than standard hunting rifles, but they were functionally the same. All semi-
automatic weapons, including those not designated as assault weapons, are capable of firing 
rounds as rapidly as the shooter can pull the trigger, allowing for rates of fire approaching 
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or even exceeding a round per second.127 The NRA had a legitimate point. Nevertheless, the 
assault weapons looked especially fearsome, and this measure too enjoyed broad public 
support. When it passed the House on August 21, 1994, 46 Republicans voted for it.128  
 There was, however, one aspect of the assault weapon ban that was of potential 
consequence: high-capacity magazines. The legislation essentially defined gun magazines 
capable of holding more than ten rounds to be assault weapons. Thirty-round magazines had 
been common. High-capacity magazines provide little benefit for hunters and target shooters 
– but they are enormously useful to mass murderers. The legislation purported to ban 
magazines holding more than ten rounds. Someone equipped with ten-round magazines must 
replace empty magazines with full magazines three times more often than someone equipped 
with thirty-round magazines. While it only takes a few seconds to reload this way, those few 
seconds give victims a chance to escape or to attack the shooter. For example, the man who 
shot Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords and eighteen other people in Tucson, was 
successfully tackled by bystanders while he was attempting to replace the empty magazine 
in his Glock 19 handgun, and nine children successfully fled from the classroom with shooter 
at the Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newton, Connecticut while he was reloading.129 
 The ban on high-capacity magazines was, however, a mirage. Not only did the 
legislation grandfather assault weapons that were manufactured before the legislation 
passed, it also grandfathered high-capacity magazines manufactured before that date. An 
estimated 25 million high-capacity magazines were in private hands when the legislation 
was passed – they were, in fact, heavily promoted while the legislation was pending 
Congress, and sold like hotcakes – and another 4.7 million exempted high-capacity 
magazines were imported to the U.S. during the first five years the legislation was effect.130 
High-capacity magazines remained readily available throughout the ten-year life of the ban. 
Researchers at the University of Pennsylvania found that while the number of assault 
weapons in private hands declined while the law was in effect, that decline was offset by a 
rise in weapons equipped with high-capacity magazines.131 
 The Brady Campaign spent its political capital on legislation that did not, in fact, make 
America safer. While Brady and other gun control advocates may have thought they would 
improve these pieces of legislation down the road, the public believed that the best available 
gun control measures had been enacted and lost interest in the issue. According to the Gallup 
Poll, the percentage of Americans who believe that gun control laws “should be made more 
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strict” declined from 78 percent in 1990 to 49 percent in 2013.132 Most importantly, the 
Brady Act entrenched acceptance of the good guy/bad guy model. Everyone accepted the 
premise that it is possible “to keep guns out of the wrong hands.” 
 The gun control movement has never recovered from its Pyrrhic victories in 1993 and 
1994. Moreover, it may well be the case that acceptance of the good guy/bad guy model led 
Supreme Court justices to believe that their decision in Heller had no adverse public health 
consequences. They made it clear that convicted felons and other dangerous people could be 
prohibited from purchasing and possessing guns. 
 Here is the second story. In 1996, Common Cause of Rhode Island launched a campaign 
to get Rhode Island to recognize the principle of separation of powers in its state 
government.133 The state legislature took the position that Rhode Island government was 
unique and did not accept that principle. As a result, the legislature could – in addition to 
creating and funding administrative agencies – also operate them. The legislature 
accomplished this by creating agencies controlled by a commission or a board, and gave 
itself – i.e., the legislature – the ability to appoint a majority of the controlling body. In the 
federal system, that would violate the principle of separation of powers and be flatly 
unconstitutional. The Rhode Island legislature even appointed sitting legislators to agency 
boards and commissions. This was a system vulnerable to – some might even say designed 
for – corruption.134 
 The state Common Cause chapter took on the issue. First, Common Cause took the 
matter to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. But the court, whose members had also been 
effectively selected by the legislature, upheld the legislature’s position.135 Common Cause 
then launched a campaign for a constitutional amendment. Most people, including the state’s 
savviest political strategists, considered that a fool’s errand. The state constitution could not 
be amended without the consent of the legislature. The legislature would not willingly yield 
an enormous source of its power absent a firestorm of voter displeasure. Voters cared about 
issues such as schools, taxes, and potholes, and were not going to understand, let alone 
become outraged, over an abstract principle of political philosophy. And yet, Common 
Cause persisted. It educated journalists and community leaders; it sent speakers to 
community groups of all kinds; it organized forums, lectures, and debates; its members wrote 
op-eds and letters-to-the-editor for newspapers. It was a vigorous and sustained effort of 
public education. During the seven-year campaign, the Providence Journal published nearly 
800 news articles, editorials, commentary articles, and letters-to-the-editor about separation 
of powers. 
 Other good government groups initially joined the effort but fell by the wayside as the 
campaign stretched on. Their familiar calculation was that they had to show their members 
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they had achieved something recently. Yet, year after year, separation of powers remained 
Common Cause’s flagship proposal. Voters began peppering state legislators with questions 
– and increasingly passionate demands – about separation of powers. Legislators started 
offering cosmetic concessions that would have allowed Common Cause to claim victory 
while actually accomplishing little. Common Cause rejected those offers. Eventually, a 
government scandal provided the spark that ignited a firestorm. For days on end, local talk 
radio was all about separation of powers. Voters sent the General Assembly so many emails 
that its system crashed. In the end, the legislature and voters approved a truly meaningful 
constitutional amendment. 
 The lesson of these two stories – as well as the NRA’s successful campaign to change 
how the Supreme Court interpreted the Second Amendment – is that it is sometimes 
necessary and possible to take the long view. Despite conventional wisdom, neither the NRA 
nor Common Cause of Rhode Island were institutionally weakened by doing so. 
 What would a decades-long campaign to look like? Both the Common Cause campaign 
to amend the Rhode Island Constitution and the NRA campaign to change the meaning of 
the Second Amendment had strong similarities. Both campaigns began with academic 
writings, which were used to give the non-consensus view legitimacy and persuade opinion 
makers such as leaders of advocacy groups, potential financial supporters, politicians, other 
academics and teachers, and – perhaps most importantly – journalists. The writings were 
expanded to popular venues such as the op-ed pages of newspapers. In the case of gun 
control, op-eds could be produced by authors with recognized expertise such as 
criminologists, sociologists, epidemiologists and public health experts, or more often, by 
newspaper columnists and journalists describing the work of researchers. The message must 
be the simple, hard truth about gun control: effective gun control is available, but it requires 
reducing handguns in general circulation. It is a message that the American public has not 
heard because gun control advocates, for political and institutional reasons, have led 
Americans to believe the myth that less draconian, “common sense” measures are available. 
At the first the message will seem jarring, but that may help it get attention. Because this is 
a long campaign, it is not necessary – indeed, it may even be counterproductive – to combine 
it with a plea of quick political action. The first, essential task is to tell the simple, hard truth 
and let it sink in. Both the message and its importance should be repeated wherever it is 
relevant. In debates over health care costs, for example, it should be noted that reducing gun 
violence would reduce public health care costs because gunshot wounds result in extremely 
expensive emergency room and trauma center visits. Both the NRA and Common Cause 
also effectively sent speakers to every venue that would have them – community groups, 
college clubs, social action committees of churches and other religious organizations, and 
radio talk shows.    
 What I have described so far is necessary but by itself insufficient. Arguments based on 
facts and logic may persuade a necessary cohort of opinion leaders, but they will not, by 
themselves, create a sea change in public opinion. Consider this statement by the eighteenth 
century Scottish politician Andrew Fletcher: 
I knew a very wise man [who] believed if a man were permitted to make all the 
ballads he need not care who should make the laws of a nation, and we find that 
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most of the ancient legislators thought that they could not well reform the manners 
of any city without the help of a lyric, and sometimes of a dramatic poet.136   
 Everyone today is familiar with the term “designated driver.” Many of us have been one 
or had someone else be one when going out on the town with a group of friends. It was not 
always so. When I was a college student, neither the term nor the concept were known. In 
1986, experts at the Harvard School of Public Health who wanted to do something about 
drunk driving met with hundreds of Hollywood screenwriters and producers, introduced 
them to the term, and asked them to include it in television scripts.137 Over a four-year 
period, the term “designated driver” was used in 160 prime-time television shows. In some 
shows, it was mentioned only in passing; in other shows, it was integral to the main plot line. 
This campaign had a profound effect on public attitudes and behavior. My point is not that 
the gun control movement must replicate the designated driver campaign for every campaign 
is different. My point is that, just as Andrew Fletcher suggested three hundred years ago, sea 
changes in public attitudes require help from artists and storytellers. 
 Storytellers are evocative. I can create a bar chat, but storytellers know how to paint 
indelible images in their audience’s mind. For example, a moment ago I made a point about 
the costs of treating gunshot wounds in hospital emergency rooms. In his novel Balance of 
Power, Richard North Patterson has a fictional President of the United States also speak 
about gunshot wounds and emergency rooms while advocating stricter gun control in a 
speech to Congress. Here is the line Patterson wrote for his fictitious President: “Only in 
America, in this city, do surgeons prepare for combat duty by training at an urban 
hospital…”138 
 We should also listen to the storytellers for their instincts about how public opinion on 
the issue might be shaped. Richard North Patterson’s Balance of Power is about an effort to 
persuade the nation to accept more rigorous gun control, and so is John Madden’s 2016 film 
Miss Sloane.139 In both stories, gun control advocates successfully employ strategies based 
upon making gun control a more salient issue for women and exposing the commercial 
interests of the gun lobby, as well as the self-interest of politicians who do its bidding. 
Moreover, in both stories the winning strategies are built on a combination of public 
education and carefully crafted evocative approaches.     
  The NRA has been a master of the evocative stratagem. It had, for example, the foresight 
to make Charlton Heston its president for a five year period beginning in 1998. The famous 
actor’s value to the NRA was extremely simple – it was nothing more than the image of 
Heston holding a musket over his head and declaring, “From my cold, dead hands!” This 
became ritual at the NRA’s annual convention and was inevitably included in that evening’s 
television newscasts. It was a double-barreled subliminal image. It semi-consciously evoked 
Moses, whom Heston famously played in Cecil B. DeMille’s 1956 movie The Ten 
Commandments,140 holding up his staff against Pharaoh and leading his people to freedom 
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under Devine guidance. Probably more significantly, it simultaneously evoked the 
Minuteman at Lexington and Concord. The power of such images should not be 
underestimated, and when deployed must be decoded and rebutted. That second image can 
be turned completely around by communicating that the Second Amendment was not written 
to protect the musket in the hands of the Minute Man in Lexington; it was written to protect 
the musket in the hands of the militia slave patrols in the South.141 I have written a law 
review article laying out that case; but to be effective it needs to be turned into a movie.    
 Finally, we need to be clear about the choice before us. The choice is not whether 
America will have effective gun control today. The choice is whether America will have 
effective gun control in the future. While public opinion, politics, and constitutional law 
currently bar the way, all three are malleable. The public, politicians, and judges can all be 
educated. That must begin, however, with telling the simple, hard truth about gun control.  
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